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Abstract. We introduce a new class of problems that contains two existing
classes: allocation problems with single-peaked preferences and bankruptcy
problems. On this class, we analyze the implications of well-known prop-
erties such as Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, resource-monotonicity,
no-envy, equal treatment of equals, and two new properties we introduce,
hierarchical no-envy and independence of nonbinding constraints. Unlike
earlier literature, we consider rules that allow free-disposability. We present
characterizations of a rule we introduce on this domain. We relate this rule
to well-known rules on the aforementioned subdomains. Based on this rela-
tion, we present a characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule called the
constrained equal awards rule.
1 Introduction
We look for a ‘‘good’’ solution to the following problem: a perfectly divisible
commodity is to be allocated among a set of agents each having an exogenous
constraint and a single-peaked preference relation on his consumption. The
(federal) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the US government reg-
ularly faces this problem when allocating pollution permits. Each permit gives
the bearer firm the right to a certain amount of pollution. A firm’s right to
pollute is also bounded by the constraints imposed by local governments. E.g.
very strict local limits may be imposed on polluters in densely populated or
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overpolluted areas.1 Assume each firm’s profit to be a strictly concave func-
tion of its output and therefore, a single-peaked function of its emissions.2
Permit allocation in US started in 1899 and is currently used in the regu-
lation of various pollutants.3 The rules used in practice are highly variable
and depend on the industry being regulated. Joskow et al. [6] give a detailed
summary of how in the US Acid Rain Program, Title IV of the 1990 Clean
Air Act regulates the allocation of SO2 permits among coal burning electric-
generating units. To summarize, a firm’s ‘‘basic’’ share is assigned proportion-
ally to an estimate of its profit maximizing emission level. Then, the shares are
adjusted through several additional provisions. A practical implication of our
analysis is the provision of a basis to evaluate such rules.
We look for Pareto optimal rules that satisfy two main properties.
Strategy-proofness requires that revealing true preferences is always a dom-
inant strategy for the agents. Strategy-proof rules are not informationally
demanding and thus cheaper and easier to implement. The significance of such
features can be highlighted with the fact that in US in 1980 there were up to
55000 major sources of industrial water pollution alone [7]. With a strategy-
proof permit allocation rule, the EPA can trust the polluter firms to truthfully
declare their profit maximizing emission levels; the firms have no incentive
to misreport. Resource-monotonicity is a solidarity property which requires
a change in the social endowment to a¤ect all agents in the same direction
(i.e., all gain or lose together). In permit allocation, the amount of pollution
rights to be distributed is periodically updated according to the current envi-
ronmental conditions. With a resource-monotonic rule, such updates a¤ect all
firms’ profits in the same way; in e¤ect, a firm can not have a larger permit as
a result of worsening environmental conditions.
Amongst the rules that satisfy these properties, some (such as the dictato-
rial rules) are not normatively appealing. To formalize this concern, we intro-
duce standard fairness properties such as no-envy [5] and equal treatment of
equals. Note, however, that the asymmetries in the consumption constraints
may sometimes represent a hierarchical relation among the agents. In permit
allocation, firms’ constraints may be related to their importance for the local
economy. Thus, we also analyze the implications of a hierarchical no-envy
property that gives priority to agents with less restrictive constraints.
Two special cases of our problem have already been center of considerable
attention: in unconstrained allocation problems [9] the agents do not have con-
sumption constraints, in bankruptcy problems [8] all agents have monotonic
preferences. In both cases, rules based on equal division (the uniform rule [9]
1 On the other hand, industries that are important for the local economies or that have
strong lobbies may not face so strict limits.
2 The relation follows since each firm’s emissions increase in its output.
3 The Refuse Act of 1899 required that all industrial waste dischargers have permits
from the US Army Corps of Engineers [7]. This law was rediscovered in 1960’s and the
Congress passed a new water quality law in 1972 which required that permits be issued
for all point-source waste discharges to watercourses.
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and the constrained equal awards rule [1], respectively) satisfy many desirable
properties. The analysis of this paper also reveals an ‘‘equal-division type’’
rule (hereafter called the constrained uniform rule).
On bankruptcy problems, this rule coincides with the constrained equal
awards rule which has been adopted as law by most major codifiers in history4
and which is the only ‘‘symmetric’’ bankruptcy rule with a strategy-proof ex-
tension to the whole domain (see Theorem 6). On unconstrained allocation
problems, however, our rule coincides with the uniform rule only when there
is excess demand. The di¤erence is due to the following reason.
In the literature on unconstrained allocation problems, feasibility requires
all of the social endowment to be allocated, even when there is excess supply
of the commodity. In our framework, however, rules satisfying this feasibility
condition violate even very basic fairness properties such as no-envy. More-
over, (unlike in unconstrained problems) excess supply is not solely due to the
agents’ preferences; even when the sum of the agents’ most preferred amounts
exceed the social endowment, there might be excess supply due to the exoge-
nous constraints. Both points are demonstrated in Example 1.
We enlarge the set of feasible allocations by assuming free-disposability of
the commodity. This is natural in permit allocation: if the amount of permits
to be distributed is larger than the sum of the firms’ profit maximizing emis-
sion levels, rules that do not satisfy free-disposability force the firms to pollute
more than their profit maximizing levels. The free-disposability assumption
enlarges the class of admissible rules: rules satisfying the ‘‘strict’’ feasibility
constraint are still admissible, but there are many more. It also makes Pareto
optimality more demanding since an allocation is now compared to a larger
set: when there is too much of the commodity, to allocate it all is now Pareto
dominated.
Finally note that due to domain di¤erences and free-disposability, our
results are not logically related to previous results obtained for the two sub-
classes. Keeping this in mind, however, we discuss each result in relation to
previous findings and compare the implications of the properties in question.
2 The model
Let Rþ ¼ RþW fþyg. There is a social endowment of E A Rþ units of
a perfectly divisible commodity to be allocated among a set N of agents.
Each i A N is characterized by an exogenous constraint ci A Rþ and a single-
peaked preference relation Ri on his consumption.5 Let Pi [Ii] be the strict
preference [indi¤erence] relation associated with Ri. Let pðRiÞ A Rþ be the
4 As an example, Aumann and Maschler [1] mention Maimonides (1135–1204): The
Laws of Lending and Borrowing, Ch. 20, Sect. 4.
5 The preference relation Ri is single-peaked if there is a unique consumption level
pðRiÞ A Rþ such that for any x; y A Rþ, [x < ya pðRiÞ or pðRiÞa y < x] implies
yPi x. Note that monotonic preferences are considered single-peaked.
Allocation problems with single-peakedness 355
most preferred consumption level for Ri. Let Rsp be the set of all single-
peaked preferences on Rþ. Let c ¼ ðc1; . . . ; cnÞ, R ¼ ðR1; . . . ;RnÞ, and pðRÞ ¼
ðpðR1Þ; . . . ; pðRnÞÞ. A constrained allocation problem (with single-peaked pref-
erences) is a triple ðR; c;EÞ A RNsp  RNþ  Rþ satisfying
P
ci bE.6 Let P
denote the set of all such problems.
An unconstrained allocation problem is an ðR; c;EÞ A P such that c ¼yN .
A bankruptcy problem is an ðR; c;EÞ A P such that pðRÞ ¼yN . Let PbHP
denote the set of all bankruptcy problems.
An allocation x A RNþ is feasible for ðR; c;EÞ A P if
P
xk aE and for
each i A N, xi a ci. Let XðR; c;EÞ denote the set of feasible allocations for
ðR; c;EÞ. Note that our definition of feasibility assumes free-disposability and
is weaker than the one used in the earlier literature (which requires
P
xk ¼ E).
We start Section 3 with a discussion of this issue.
A constrained allocation rule is a function F : P ! RNþ that assigns to each
ðR; c;EÞ A P, a feasible allocation x A X ðR; c;EÞ. The constrained uniform rule,
CU , is defined as follows: for all ðR; c;EÞ A P and all i A N, (i) if E aP
minfck; pðRkÞg, CUiðR; c;EÞ ¼ minfci; pðRiÞ; lg where l A Rþ satisfiesP
minfck; pðRkÞ; lg ¼ E and (ii) if E >
P
minfck; pðRkÞg, CUiðR; c;EÞ ¼
minfci; pðRiÞg.
A constrained allocation rule F is Pareto optimal if for all ðR; c;EÞ A P
and all x A XðR; c;EÞ, if there is i A N such that xi Pi FiðR; c;EÞ, then there
is j A N such that FjðR; c;EÞPj xj. It is strategy-proof if for all ðR; c;EÞ A P,
all i A N, and all R 0i A Rsp, FiðRi;Ri; c;EÞRi FiðR 0i;Ri; c;EÞ. It satisfies
resource-monotonicity if for all ðR; c;EÞ A P and all E 0 A Rþ either for all
i AN, FiðR; c;EÞRi FiðR; c;E 0Þ or for all i AN, FiðR; c;E 0ÞRi FiðR; c;EÞ. These
properties are already explained in the introduction.
A constrained allocation rule F satisfies no-envy (is envy-free) [5] if
each agent prefers his share to the share of another agent (subject to his
consumption constraint): for all ðR; c;EÞ A P and i; j A N, FiðR; c;EÞRi
minfci;FjðR; c;EÞg. It satisfies hierarchical no-envy if each agent prefers his
share to the share of another agent with a smaller constraint: for all ðR; c;EÞ A
P and i; j A N such that cj a ci, FiðR; c;EÞRi FjðR; c;EÞ.7 It satisfies equal
treatment of equals if identical agents obtain similar shares: for all ðR; c;EÞ A
P and i; j A N such that Ri ¼ Rj and ci ¼ cj , FiðR; c;EÞ Ii FjðR; c;EÞ. A con-
strained allocation rule F satisfies independence of nonbinding constraints if an
agent’s share is not a¤ected from an increase in his consumption constraint if
this constraint was not binding in the first place: for all ðR; c;EÞ A P, all i A N
such that pðRiÞa ci, and all c 0i b ci, FiðR; c;EÞ ¼ FiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞ. It is con-
tinuous with respect to E if small changes in the social endowment do not have
a big e¤ect on the agents’ shares: for each ðR; c;EÞ A P and for each sequence
of constrained allocation problems fðR; c;E uÞg in P such that fE ng ! E,
fF ðR; c;E uÞg ! FðR; c;EÞ.
6 Since no agent i can obtain a share xi > ci, assuming
P
ci bE does not cause any
loss in generality.
7 Note that since FjðR; c;EÞa cj a ci, FjðR; c;EÞ ¼ minfci;FjðR; c;EÞg.
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3 Results
We first demonstrate that there are constrained allocation problems in which
no envy-free allocation satisfies the strict feasibility constraint,
P
xk ¼ E.
Example 1. Let N ¼ f1; 2g. Let c ¼ ð4; 10Þ, E ¼ 10, and R A RNsp such that
pðRÞ ¼ ð9; 2Þ. The feasible shares for Agent 1 are x1 A ½0; 4. Since x1 þ x2 ¼
10, x2 A ½6; 10. For any x1 < 4, x2 > 6, and minfx2; 4g ¼ 4. Then, 4P1 x1 rules
out all x1 < 4 by no-envy applied to Agent 1. This implies x1 ¼ 4. But, since
4P2 6 this case is ruled out by no-envy applied to Agent 2.
This example implies that constrained allocation rules which satisfy
this strict feasibility constraint are bound to violate no-envy. In this paper
we use the weaker feasibility constraint,
P
xk aE (i.e., we assume free-
disposability). This strenghtens Pareto optimality: if
P
minfpðRkÞ; ckgaE,
the unique Pareto optimal allocation is xi ¼ minfpðRiÞ; cig for all i A N.8
If
P
minfpðRkÞ; ckg > E, Pareto optimality implies
P
xk ¼ E and that each
agent i get an xi aminfpðRiÞ; cig.
Next we describe the class of allocation rules that are Pareto opti-
mal and strategy-proof:9 A constrained allocation rule F : P ! RNþ satisfies
Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness if and only if for all i A N, there is
bi : R
Nnfig
sp  RNþ  Rþ ! Rþ such that for all ðR; c;EÞ A P,
(i) biðRi; c;EÞ A ½0; ci,
(ii)
P
minfbkðRk; c;EÞ; pðRkÞg ¼ E, and





minfck; pðRkÞg < E:

This large class, however, has a single envy-free member.
Theorem 1. The constrained uniform rule is the only constrained allocation rule
that satisfies Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, and no-envy.
The proof is similar to that of Ching [3] who shows the uniform rule to be
the only Pareto optimal (with respect to strict feasibility), strategy-proof, and
envy-free rule on unconstrained allocation problems.10 On this subdomain,
replacing no-envy with anonymity [9] or equal treatment of equals [4] does not
change the conclusion. This, however, is not the case in our domain.
The constrained uniform rule satisfies anonymity, equal treatment of equals,
and hierarchical no-envy. Unfortunately, some very unappealing rules also
8 Without free-disposal, Pareto optimality implies the weaker xi bminfpðRiÞ; cig.
9 This result is a direct modification of the characterization in Barbera` et al. [2]. Its
proof follows from a modification of Lemmas 1 and 2 in Sprumont [9]. Here, due to
the free-disposal assumption, it is su‰cient to specify one function per agent (instead of
two).
10 However, the two results are not logically related due to the domain di¤erence and
the free-disposal assumption.
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satisfy these properties as well as Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness.
Next, we present such a rule which is ‘‘almost dictatorial’’.
Example 2. Let N ¼ f1; 2g. Define the constrained allocation rule as fol-
lows: if c1 ¼ c2, apply the constrained uniform rule, CU; if ci > cj, let xi ¼
minfci; pðRiÞ;Eg and xj ¼ minfE  xi; cj; pðRjÞg. This rule satisfies Pareto
optimality, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals, hierarchical no-envy,
and even anonymity.
Unlike in other models, these properties do not rule out undesirable rules
since none require consistency in the way a constrained allocation rule reacts
to changes in the exogenous constraints. Next, we analyze the implications of
such a property, independence of nonbinding constraints.
Theorem 2. The constrained uniform rule is the only constrained allocation rule
that satisfies Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, equal treatment of equals,
and independence of nonbinding constraints.
If a constrained allocation rule satisfies hierarchical no-envy, it also satisfies
equal treatment of equals.11 Therefore, the following result is a direct corollary
of Theorem 2.
Corollary 3. The constrained uniform rule is the only constrained allocation
rule that satisfies Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, hierarchical no-envy,
and independence of nonbinding constraints.
On bankruptcy problems, most allocation rules are resource-monotonic
[11]. On unconstrained allocation problems, no envy-free rule satisfies this
property, but a weaker property is widely satisfied [10]. On our domain, the
constrained uniform rule is resource-monotonic. Moreover, Pareto optimal rules
satisfying this property are continuous with respect to E.
Lemma 4. If a constrained allocation rule satisfies Pareto optimality, and
resource-monotonicity, it is continuous with respect to E.
This lemma leads to the following characterization.
Theorem 5. The constrained uniform rule is the only constrained allocation rule
that satisfies Pareto optimality, no-envy, and resource-monotonicity.
The proof is similar to that of Thomson [10] who shows the uniform rule
to be the only Pareto optimal (with respect to strict feasibility) and envy-free
rule which satisfies a weaker ‘‘one-sided resource monotonicity’’ property on
unconstrained allocation problems.
In bankruptcy problems, all agents have identical monotonic pref-
erences. Therefore, bankruptcy rules are not designed to handle preference
information. However, any bankruptcy rule B : Pb ! RNþ has a natural exten-
11 However, the converse is not true. A simple example to demonstrate this can be
obtained by modifying the rule in Example 2 so that when ci > cj , agent j (instead of i)
is the dictator.
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sion FB : P ! RNþ to the domain of constrained allocation problems: given
ðR; c;EÞ A P, for each i A N, update i ’s constraint to ci ¼minfci; pðRiÞg. Since
Pareto optimality implies xi a pðRiÞ, this operation basically embeds Pareto
optimality in agent i ’s consumption constraint. Let,
FBðR; c;EÞ ¼ BðR
N
m ; c
;EÞ if P ck bE;
c otherwise.

The constrained equal awards rule is defined as follows: for all
ðR; c;EÞ A Pb and all i A N, CEAiðR; c;EÞ ¼ minfci; lg where l A Rþ satisfiesP
minfck; lg ¼ E. It is straightforward to check that FCEA ¼ CU .
The restriction of equal treatment of equals to bankruptcy problems
requires agents with identical constraints to receive identical shares; we call
this property equal treatment of equal constraints.12 It is satisfied by most of
the well known bankruptcy rules, including the proportional rule, the Talmu-
dic rule [1], and the constrained equal loss rule. However, the extension (to P)
of only a single one of these rules is strategy-proof.
Theorem 6. Constrained equal awards rule is the only bankruptcy rule on
Pb that satisfies equal treatment of equal constraints and which has a strategy-
proof extension to P.
This result also implies that among Pareto optimal and strategy-proof
rules, constrained uniform rule is the only one that satisfies equal treatment
of equals and which is consistent in the sense that it is preserved under the
(aforementioned) extension of its restriction to bankruptcy problems.
4 Proofs
In the proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and 5, it is straightforward to show that CU
satisfies the given properties. Conversely, suppose F0CU also satisfies them.
Let ðR; c;EÞ A P be such that F ðR; c;EÞ0CUðR; c;EÞ. By Pareto optimality,P
minfpðRkÞ; ckg > E. Each proof then continues as follows.
Theorem 1. Since FðR; c;EÞ0CUðR; c;EÞ, there is i A N such that FiðR; c;EÞ
< CUiðR; c;EÞaminfpðRiÞ; cig. Let R 0i A Rsp be such that pðR 0iÞ ¼ pðRiÞ and
E P 0i FiðR; c;EÞ. Let R 0 ¼ ðR 0i;RiÞ. Then, by strategy-proofness, FiðR; c;EÞ ¼
FiðR 0; c;EÞ. Since CU is also strategy-proof, CUiðR; c;EÞ ¼ CUiðR 0; c;EÞ.





FkðR 0; c;EÞ ¼ E. Thus, there is j A N such that CUjðR 0; c;EÞ
< FjðR 0; c;EÞ a minfpðR 0j Þ; cjg. By definition of CU, CUjðR 0; c;EÞ <
minfpðR 0j Þ; cjg implies that for all k A N, CUjðR 0; c;EÞbCUkðR 0; c;EÞ. Then
FiðR 0; c;EÞ<CUiðR 0; c;EÞaCUjðR 0; c;EÞ<FjðR 0; c;EÞ implies FiðR 0; c;EÞ <
12 Formally, a bankruptcy rule B : P ! RNþ satisfies equal treatment of equal con-
straints if for all ðRNm ; c;EÞ A Pb and all i; j A N s.t. ci ¼ cj , FiðR; c;EÞ ¼ FjðR; c;EÞ.
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FjðR 0; c;EÞ. Thus FjðR 0; c;EÞP 0i FiðR 0; c;EÞ. Since FiðR 0; c;EÞ<minfpðR 0iÞ; cig,
minfci;FjðR 0; c 0;EÞgP 0i FiðR 0; c;EÞ, contradicting no-envy. 9
Theorem 2. Let c ¼ maxfci : i A Ng and R A argmaxfpðRiÞ : i A Ng. If
R ¼ ðR; . . . ;RÞ and c ¼ ðc; . . . ; cÞ, then by equal treatment of equals and
Pareto optimality E ¼PFkðR; c;EÞ0
P
CUkðR; c;EÞ ¼ E, a contradiction.
If R0 ðR; . . . ;RÞ or c0 ðc; . . . ; cÞ we proceed as follows.
Step 1. Since FðR; c;EÞ0CUðR; c;EÞ, by Pareto optimality, there is i A N
such that CUiðR; c;EÞ < FiðR; c;EÞaminfpðRiÞ; cig. If Ri ¼ R and ci ¼ c,
then skip to Step 2. Otherwise, there are two possible cases:
Case 1. ½ pðRiÞa ci Let c 0i ¼ c. Then, by independence of nonbinding con-
straints, CUiðR; c;EÞ ¼ CUiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞ and FiðR; c;EÞ ¼ FiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞ.
Next, let R 0i ¼ R. Then, CUiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞ ¼ CUiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ.
Moreover, as we show next, by Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness
of F, FiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞ ¼ FiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ. To see this, suppose Ri is
such that E Pi FiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞ. By strategy-proofness applied to Ri,
FiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞRi FiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ. This implies, FiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ
aFiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞ. Also by strategy-proofness applied to R 0i,
FiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞR 0i FiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞ. Therefore,
FiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞaFiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ.
If FiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞRi E, let REi be such that pðREi Þ ¼ pðRiÞ and
E PEi FiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞ. By Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness,
FiðR; c 0i ; ci;EÞ ¼ FiðREi ;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ. Then, one can apply the above
reasoning to show the desired equality. Altogether, we have
CUiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ < FiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ.
Case 2. ½ci < pðRiÞ Let Rci be such that pðRci Þ ¼ ci. Then, CUiðR; c;EÞ ¼
CUiðRci ;Ri; c;EÞ and, by Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness
FiðR; c;EÞ ¼ FiðRci ;Ri; c;EÞ. Thus, CUiðRci ;Ri; c;EÞ < FiðRci ;Ri; c;EÞa
minfpðRci Þ; cig. Since pðRci Þa ci, we are in Case 1 and, repeating the same
steps, we have CUiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ < FiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ.
In either case, we change Ri to R
0
i ¼ R and ci to c 0i ¼ c. If ðR 0i;RiÞ ¼
ðR; . . . ;RÞ and ðc 0i ; ciÞ ¼ ðc; . . . ; cÞ. Then by equal treatment of equals
and Pareto optimality, E ¼PFkðR; c;EÞ >
P
CUkðR; c;EÞ ¼ E, a contra-





CUkðR; c;EÞ ¼ E, there is j A N
such that FjðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ < CUjðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞaminfpðRjÞ; cjg. If
Rj ¼ R and cj ¼ c, then since R 0i ¼ R, c 0i ¼ c, FjðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ <
CUjðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ and CUiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ < FiðR 0i;Ri; c 0i ; ci;EÞ
contradicts equal treatment of equals. Otherwise, let R 0j ¼ R and c 0j ¼ c.
Following the same steps in Cases 1 and 2 above, we obtain
FjðR 0ij ;Rij ; c 0ij; cij ;EÞ < CUjðR 0ij ;Rij ; c 0ij; cij ;EÞ.
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If ðR 0ij ;RijÞ ¼ ðR; . . . ;RÞ and ðc 0ij; cijÞ ¼ ðc; . . . ; cÞ, then by equal treat-
ment of equals and Pareto optimality, E ¼PFkðR; c;EÞ <
P
CUkðR; c;EÞ ¼
E, a contradiction. Otherwise, we apply Step 1 to ðR 0ij;Rij ; c 0ij ; cij;EÞ. At
each of Steps 1 and 2, we replace the preferences of a new agent by R and
his constraint by c. Since N is finite, such repeated replacement eventually
leads to a contradiction. 9
Theorem 5. Since F ðR; c;EÞ0CUðR; c;EÞ and F is Pareto optimal, there are
i; j A N such that FiðR; c;EÞ < minfpðRiÞ; cig and FiðR; c;EÞ < FjðR; c;EÞ. By
no-envy, FiðR; c;EÞRi minfFjðR; c;EÞ; cig. Since F satisfies Pareto optimality
and resource-monotonicity, it is continuous with respect to E, and thus, as E
goes to 0, the shares of both agents change continuously. Then there is E 0 aE
such that FjðR; c;E 0Þ ¼ minfpðRiÞ; cig. By no-envy, FiðR; c;E 0Þ ¼ FjðR; c;E 0Þ.
Then, from E to E 0, i is better o¤ and j is worse o¤, contradicting resource-
monotonicity. 9
The remaining proofs do not use the supposition made at the beginning of
this section.
Lemma 4. Let F : P ! RNþ be a constrained allocation rule that satisfies the
given properties. Let fEtg be a sequence in Rþ converging E. For each t A N,
let FðR; c;EtÞ ¼ xt and let F ðR; c;EÞ ¼ y. Note that fxtg is a subset of the
compact set
Q
k AN ½0;minfpðRkÞ; ckg, and let X be the set of its limit points.
Let x A X. Then there is a subsequence fxug of fxtg converging x.
Step 1. Note that fP xnkg !
P
xk and fminfE n;
P
minfpðRkÞ; ckggg !
minfE;PminfpðRkÞ; ckgg. By Pareto optimality, for all n A N
P
xnk ¼





Step 2. For all i A N, xi aminfpðRiÞ; cig. Otherwise, there is a n A N such
that for all nb n, xni > minfpðRiÞ; cig. However, Pareto optimality implies
xni aminfpðRiÞ; cig, a contradiction.
Next, we will show that x ¼ y. Since x A X is arbitrary, this
implies X ¼ fyg, the desired result. First assume E bPminfpðRkÞ; ckg.




minfpðRkÞ; ckg, and by Step 2, for all i A N,
xi aminfpðRiÞ; cig. Thus, by Pareto optimality of F, for all i A N, xi ¼





xk ¼ E, and by Step 2, for all k A N, xk aminfpðRkÞ; ckg.
Suppose x0 y. Then, there are i; j A N such that xi < yi aminfpðRiÞ; cig
and yj < xj aminfpðRjÞ; cjg. Then, there is n A N such that for all
nb n, E n a
P
minfpðRkÞ; ckg, also xni < yi aminfpðRiÞ; cig, and yj < xnj a
minfpðRjÞ; cjg. But then, from E n to E, i is strictly better o¤ and j is strictly
worse o¤, contradicting resource-monotonicity. 9
Theorem 6. It is straightforward to show that CEA satisfies the given properties.
Conversely, let B : Pb ! RNþ be a bankruptcy rule that satisfies the properties.
It is straightforward to check that then FB also satisfies Pareto optimality, equal
treatment of equals, and independence of nonbinding constraints. But then, by
Theorem 2, FB ¼ CU. Therefore, B ¼ CEA. 9
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